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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
D}~LTA H. LEWIS,

I

Plai~t~{ ~nd Appellant,

C. A. SAVAGE, KENNETH C.
SAVAGE, C. A. SAVAGE doing
business as SAVAGE COAL)
~\KD TIMBER COMPANY and
SAVAGE COAL AND TIMBER
COMPANY,
Defendants, and Respondents

REPLY
BRIEF OF
APPELLANT

Appeal No. 8733

ARGUMENT ON REPLY
Because of certain matters raised in the Brief of
Respondents, the plaintiff and appellant deems it necessary to file a short reply brief. Thia brief reply will
cover briefly three points : 1. Imputed Negligence, 2.

Xegligence of the Defendants, 3. Definition of "Park".
I. lMPUrrED NEGLIGENCE
On Page~ 8 and 9 the respondents refer to the pretrial conference held in this case, and then assert that
when issues of fact and questionl::l of law have been
formed at pre-trial, no proof is required at the trial.
Appellant;-; disagree with this

po~ition

asserted by
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the respondents. In the first place, following an informal discussion at the pre-trial hearing, the trial Court
decided that it was not necessary to formulate any pretrial issues, and no pre-trial order was entered by the
Court. We realize that this matter as raised by respondents in their Brief is outside of the record, but because
an issu~ has been made of it by the respondents, we deem
it necessary to set forth our views concerning what went
on at pre-trial.
At the pre-trial, defendants raised the issue of contributory negligence. Counsel for the plaintiff expressed
complete surprise that contributory negligence would be
raised at which tiine defendants' counsel stated that
under the law of Idaho the negligence, if any, of a husband was in1puted to the wife. This was purely an assertion on the part of the defendants and at no time
would or did plaintiff's counsel agree that such \Yas the
Jaw in Idaho. In fact, the position wa" taken by plaintiff'~ counsel that the~· were not aware of any law where
the negligence of a husband could be in1puted to a wife
except in a principal-agent relationship. At that point.
the trial Judge remarked to defendants' counsel that
the dortrine of in1puted negligence "·as not the law in
1 ·tall and that in the ahsenre of proof it would be as~mnPd that tltP law of an~· foreign jurisdiction would be
t!H· ~alllP a~ in rtah. There ('Pl'tainl~- was no adn1ission
that thP law ol' Idaho would intpute the negligence of a
1111..-halld to a wife nor wa~ there an~· stipulation or ad-
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mission that Idaho was a community property State.
rrhere was no determination made at that time

th~t

under the laws of Idaho the doctrine of imputed negligence existed, nor has there been any such determination
made since said time. Nor has there been any proof offered in any form whatsoever, including the brief of the
respondents on file before this Court, which establishes
that the laws of Idaho recognizes the doctrine of imputed
negligence.
We strongly contend that at no time or at no place
has the doctrine of imputed negligence ever been established in this case.
But to go a step further, even if we assume that the
1loctrine of imputed negligence does exist in Idaho, we
then say that it is not aplplicable in this case, and we cite
now, as cited _in our Brief, the case of Bruton vs.
T'illoria (1956, Cal.), 292 P. (2d) 638, which states
unequivocally that even in a com1nunity property State,
where the doctrine of imputed negligence is recognized,
the negligence of the husband is NOT imputed to the
wife where the parties are residents of a non-community
property State.
The proof presented by the plaintiff is clear and
convincing that the plaintiff and her husband were residents of ~I ontana, and that ~I ontana was not a connnunii~' property State. rrh(' defendants and respondents have
<~hosen to ignore this :-;tatn:-; of the law. If there is any
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authority to the contrary, it has not been furnished to
the plaintiff and appellants, or to either the trial Court
or to the Supreme Court to our knowledge.

2. NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS
It is the plaintiff's contention that the defendants
were guilty of negligence which was a contributing cause
to the accident ( 1) by reason of their breach of the ordinance, and (2) independent of the ordinance, that
plaintiffs were guilty of common-law negligence, and
it is plaintiff's position that reasonable minds cannot
differ on either of these points.

Reference is n1ade to the recent case of Burns cs.
FishPr, (~font. E);)7), 313 P. (2d) 104-!. wherein the ~fon
tana Supreme Court held that a party was guilty of
negligence as a n1atter of law when he re1nained seated
in his truck that was stalled on a main arterial highway where traffic can be expected to be passed at any
tirne. rrhe Court refused to subn1it the question of negligence to a jur~·. The theory of the case, very strongly pre~E:>nted by the ~fontana Suprerne Court, is that reasonable n1inds cannot differ that it is negligence to remain
~Pated in a tnwk stopped on a rnain arterial highway
without appropriate warning n1easures being taken,
and that ~ueh neglig-PIH'e E:>xist.s even though the lights
of the truck are burning at the ti1ue of the collision.
rpltt> :\lmJtana Court eitP:-; a nmnber of .Jiaryland
<·a~P~. nnd in particular, the ea~e of ~11 art in rs. Sweeney
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207 Md. :l-!:3, 114 A. 2d 825, where plaintiff remained in
a car which was allowed to remain on the traveled
portion of a highway and was struck

b~-

an oncoming ve-

hicle. Plaintiff was held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. rrhe l\faryland Court stated:
"It is axion1atic that the law places upon one the
duty of exercising reasonable care for his own
protection under any and all circumstances and
that this requirement of the law is little more
than is naturally practised under the instinct of
self-preservation. What an ordinarily prudent
and careful person would do under a given set
of circumstances is usually controlled by the instinctive urge to protect himself from harm.
Yockel vs. Gerstadt, 154 Md. 188, 194, 140 A. 40.
This principle has been applied where one leaves
a place of safety to venture into a place or posture
of danger, and is harmed; in such cases, the venturesome one often has been held to be guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Yocket vs. Gerstadt, supra; Billmeyer vs. State
to Use of Whiteman, 192 Md. 419, 64 A. 2d 755;
Schaub vs. Community Cab, Inc., 198 Md. 216, 81
A. 2d 597 ; Domeski vs. Atlantic Refining Co., 202
Md. 562,97 A. 2d 313. Conversely, where one who
remains in a place of danger with time and the
physical ability to leave and is harmed, the courts
have often held such failure to act to be contributory negligence as a matter of law. Restatement Torts Sec. 466".
~Iany cases are there cited in support of the
statement. See also to the same effect Western
Casualty & Surety Co. vs. Dairyland, etc., Co.,
273 Wis. 349, 77 N. W. 2d 599.
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We feel that reasonable men cannot differ on the
fact that the defendants in this case are guilty of negligence regardless of the violation of any ordinance or
statute.
3. DEFINITION OF "PARK"
On page 6 of respondents' brief, a definition of
'• park'' taken from the Idaho Code is stated.
According to respondents, "park" means the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, otherwise than
temporarily for the purpose and while actually engaged
in loading or unloading. We say that the defendants'
conduct falls squarely and directly within this Idaho
definition of "park", even ifwe accept as true the defendants testinwny that the only purpose in stopping
was to check the load and to tighten the binders. This
aet. if true, on the part of the respondents does not
consist of "actually engaged in loading or unloading".
The case of State t·s. Hint.z cited by respondents on page
6 of their brief does not construe the statute quoted by
respondents but involves an entirely different statute of
the Idaho Code.
In fact, it construes a provision of the Idaho Code
whieil ~pecifically say~ that the statute involved does
not apply to the driver of anr vehicle which i~ disabled
while on the paved or improved or 1nain traveled portion ol' a ilig-Jnya~·. It i~ ePrtainly not any authority
in tili~ <'a~P.
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\V" e submit that by respondents' own definition,
the:· were "parked" in violation -of the Alam-eda City

Ordinance.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, if it i" as a Inatter of law negligence
to remain in a stalled truck, then certainly as a Inatter
of law and knowledge and common sense of Courts it
is certainly negligent to rmnain in a stopped truck when
the truck is capable of motion and the drivers intentionally stop it for 20 minutes or half an hour on a
main arterial highway going through a City. Reasonable minds cannot differ but that it is negligence under
such circumstances to stop the truck and allow it to
remain in that position for an appreciable length of time.
We strongly contend that the stopping of the defendants truck and allowing it to rmnain there without flares constitutes negligence which was a proximate
eause or contributing factor toward the plaintiff's injuries.
Respectfully Subinitted,
CHARLES P. OLSON,
JOHN H. JARDINE,
:MAURY, SHONE & SULLIVAN
Attorne:·s for Plaintiff and Appellant
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